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INTOXICATION TESTS IN DALLAS COUNTY
C HEMISTS and medical scientists have known for quite some
time that it is the concentration of alcohol reaching a per-
son's nerve centers in the brain and spinal cord, and not neces-
sarily how much he has had to drink, that makes him intoxicated
and affects his ability to drive a motor vehicle. Further, scientists
know that the concentration of alcohol in the blood stream is an
accurate index to the amount of alcohol which reaches the brain
and nerve centers of the body. Yet, it is only recently that sci-
entific tests to show the concentration of alcohol in an accused's
blood stream have been used in Texas to any large extent in
driving-while-intoxicated (DWI) cases.
Generally, three methods have been developed by scientists
to determine the blood alcohol concentration. The most direct,
of course, is a chemical analysis of the blood itself. But the same
determination may also be obtained by a chemical analysis of the
breath or urine, inasmuch as scientists have established a direct
correlation between the amount of alcohol in the blood and that
present in the breath or urine.
All three types of tests have been used to some extent in Texas.
The Texas Highway Patrol has used blood tests for some time, and
the chemical analyses of blood are made at the Department of
Public Safety laboratories in Austin. Other law enforcement
agencies in Texas have used, at least in some cases, the breath
and urine tests in addition to blood tests.
In Dallas County only the blood and breath tests are used.1
Some blood tests are taken by both city and county authorities
where the accused is sent to the hospital because of possible in-
' The first intoximeter was used in August, 1950.
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juries, and the necessary personnel and equipment are available.
But in most cases a breath specimen is taken at the scene of the
arrest by means of an instrument known as the intoximeter, and
the test is administered by an officer trained in the necessary pro-
cedure. Later the chemical analysis of the breath is made at the
laboratory at Parkland Hospital, where the blood specimens are
also analyzed. The urine test is not used in Dallas County.
The intoximeter is an instrument which is really two tests in
one. The accused inflates a balloon, and the breath is allowed
to pass through a colored solution. If the concentration of alcohol
is great enough, the solution will discolor in a given number of
seconds. This is an approximate test which indicates to the officer
whether or not to file a charge against the accused. The remainder
of the breath passes through a chemical train consisting of two
tubes which have already been weighed and analyzed by the
chemist at the laboratory. One tube absorbs the alcohol and water
in the breath, and the other tube absorbs the carbon dioxide. The
instrument is then sealed and labeled and sent to the laboratory
where the chemist can analyze the chemicals in the tubes and
determine the concentration of alcohol in the accused's blood.
Another instrument known as the Harger breath test or drunk-
ometer is used elsewhere in Texas.
According to our experiences in Dallas County, in excess of
25 percent of the cases the chemical analysis shows that the
accused was not sufficiently intoxicated to warrant the chemist's
testimony that in his opinion the person to whom the test was
administered was intoxicated. Such cases are, of course, dis-
missed. This fact, coupled with the circumstance that many peo-
ple apprehended for drunk driving pass the first part of the test
and are never filed on, shows that this scientific test is a boon
to the innocent as well as a great aid to the prosecution of the
guilty.2 Before these tests were used, a person apprehended would
2 The accused has been found guilty in approximately 98 percent of the cases in
Dallas County where the tests have been used, but the percentage is much smaller
where the jury did not have benefit of the scientific evidence.
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have to plead guilty before the court or take his chances on a jury
verdict where the only testimony would be the opinion of officers
and lay witnesses as to whether or not he was intoxicated. It is
not difficult to see how unreliable opinion testimony of this type
can be, especially where there is some evidence of drinking. It
is even more unreliable where there has been a collision and the
accused, as well as the passengers of the other vehicle, is badly
shaken up or knocked unconscious. As the Texas Court of Crim-
inal Appeals has recently pointed out, it would appear to be an
advantage to both the prosecution and the defense to have a com-
pletely accurate means of determining the debatable question of
intoxication.8
Assuming that proper care, control, and custody of the tests
are proved, three main objections have been leveled in Texas at
their admissibility in evidence:'
1. They are unreliable or inaccurate.
2. They violate Article 727 of the Revised Code of Criminal
Procedure (1925) (the so-called confession statute).
3. They violate the constitutional right of the accused against
self-incrimination (Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitu-
tion of the State of Texas and Article 3 of the Revised
Code of Criminal Procedure (1925)).
The first objection has been held by the court of criminal
appeals as being one that goes to the weight of the evidence and
not to its admissibility. Two recent decisions stand out on this
proposition: Holloway v. State,5 a case in which a urine test was
3 Jones v. State -......... Tex. Crim. Rep --------- -- -------... S. W. 2d ----------- (1952).
4 For a comprehensive survey of the law of admissibility of intoxication tests in the
United States see DONIcAN, CHEMICAL TEST CASE LAW (Traffic Institute, Northwestern
University, 1950) 27-61. A fourth objection has been raised in other jurisdictions that
the tests violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (illegal
search and seizure), but such an objection in Texas has not come to this writer's atten-
tion. For a discussion of this point see op. cit. at 27-30.
5 146 Tex. Crim. Rep. 353, 175 S.W. 2d 258 (1943).
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involved, and McKay v. State,' a case in which a Harger breath
test was used. A more recent case, Jones v. State,7 appealed from
Dallas County and not yet reported, reviews the whole question
of scientific tests for intoxication and will be discussed further
below.
In the Holloway case the accused signed a "waiver," giving
his consent to a urine test. The results of the chemical analysis
were not contested but were objected to on the grounds that they
were obtained by a formula the accuracy or reliability of which
had not been established. Further, it was argued that if the
accused were intoxicated, it was apparent that he did not know
what he was doing when he signed the "waiver" and therefore
did not voluntarily give his consent. The court held that the first
objection went to the weight of the evidence and not to its admis-
sibility. On the second proposition the court distinguished Apodaca
v. State8 as being a case where no consent to any of the things
done to the accused was shown. The court observed that the ac-
cused in the instant case never claimed in his testimony that he
was so drunk that he did not know what he was doing, but denied
that he was under the influence of alcohol at all, and the evidence
was held admissible.
In the McKay case the defense complained of the accuracy
or reliability of the Harger breath test and of the testimony of
an expert witness. The conclusions based on the results of test,
testified to by an expert, were excepted to because there was some
disagreement among scientists as to the machine's accuracy. Again
the court held that these objections went to the weight of the
evidence and not to its admissibility. The court held that the
evidence was admissible for what it was worth. Comment was
made that there are many scientific facts with which some sci-
.Tex. Crim. Rep......, 235 S.W. 2d 173 (1950).
7 Commented upon supra at note 3.
8 140 Tex. Crim. Rep. 593, 146 S.W. 2d 381 (1941).
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entists would disagree, and that in all probability a scientist may
be found who will disagree with practically every generally ac-
cepted theory - even to the fact that the world is round. But the
opinion of these dissenters by no means bars the evidence of a
scientific truth where the expert is qualified by training and
experience to testify and to give his opinion.
The court quoted at length from the work done at the Traffic
Institute of Northwestern University with reference to scientific
intoxication tests and pointed out:
... [T]he President's Highway Safety Conference, the American Med.
ical Association's Committee on Street and Highway Accidents, the
National Safety Council's Committee for Tests for Intoxication, and
other national organizations have recommended the passage of laws
by the states which will recognize the value of chemical analyses of the
blood, urine, breath, or other bodily substances, and give rise to the
presumption that if the test shows the accused to have .05 per cent or
less by weight of alcohol that he is not under the influence of intoxi-
cating liquor; that if he has in excess of that amount but less than .15
per cent, no presumption rests one way or the other; that where a test
shows .15 per cent or more by weight of alcohol in his blood it shall
be presumed that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating
liquor and that such evidence shall not be construed as limiting the
introduction of other competent evidence bearing upon the question of
his intoxication.9
The Court further stated:
•.. The Legislature of Texas may pass such law, if within its constitu-
tional powers, but the courts of Texas have no legislative duties or
powers .... [I]t is our view that the bill as taken goes only to the accu-
racy of the instrument. 10
Objections numbered 2 and 3 above have usually been lumped
together in one objection, and it was only recently that our court
of criminal appeals has made a distinction between them in driv-
ing-while-intoxicated cases. For years some lawyers and courts
1 235 S. W. 2d at 175.
30 Ibid. Such a statute adapted to our Code has been drafted under the author's
supervision and has been recommended to the Legislature as an addition to the driving.
while-intoxicated statute (to become Article 802d of the TEX. REV. PEN. CODE (1925)).
This statute would -make a legal presumption out of what is now only a medical or
scientific presumption. Twelve states have a similar statute at the present time.
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did not realize that the rules on which the objections were based
are over a hundred years apart in origin and that they were
founded for different reasons and are based on different princi-
ples. These lawyers and courts have been under the misconcep-
tion that the confession statute and guaranty against self-incrimi-
nation were based on the same proposition."
Article 727 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that a
confession may not be used if it was made while the accused was
in jail or in custody of an officer unless it was voluntarily made
after proper warning by the person to whom it was made and
was reduced to writing and signed by the accused. For some time
it was thought that the arresting officer was required to get the
accused's permission in writing in the form used for confessions
in order to give the accused an intoxication test of any kind. But
very recently the court of criminal appeals recognized the dis-
tinction between the confession statute and the constitutional pro-
vision against self-incrimination and stated that an agreement to
take a scientific alcoholic test was not in the nature of a confes-
sion. Thus, Article 727 had no application to the obtaining of
consent for such a test.'" This holding is an important one, and
it is a great step forward when one considers the broad interpreta-
tion formerly given to the statute by the court."
The constitutional and statutory provisions against self-incrimi-
nation in Texas provide that one accused of crime shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself. The constitutions of
some other states employ slightly different wording ("shall not be
compelled to testify against himself" or "furnish evidence against
himself"), but regardless of this variation the courts and text
writers trace the rule to the ecclesiastical courts of England and
agree that our constitutional and statutory provisions are merely
11 See 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) §§ 817 et seq. and 8 id., § 2250 et seq.
12 Heath v. State, -----.-Tex. Crim. Rep .-.......... 244 S. W. 2d 815 (1951) ; Brown
v. State, .------- Tex. Crim. Rep .........- , 240 S. W. 2d 310 (1951).
13 The court of criminal appeals has held the statute applicable to any act "tanta-
mount to or in the nature of a confession." See MCCORMICK AND RAY, TEXAS LAW OF
EVIDENCE (1937) § 527.
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declaratory of the common law. Moreover, these statutory and
constitutional provisions neither enlarge nor diminish the com-
mon law rule,1 and the only principle behind it is to prevent an
accused from being forced to testify or be a witness against him-
self. The rule was never intended to exclude physical evidence or
evidence which speaks for itself, but only to exclude testimonial
evidence of the accused against himself.
McCormick and Ray state: "The privilege has its limits, and
anything which does not make the accused a witness does not
violate the privilege."1 In cases not involving drunk driving the
court of criminal appeals has accepted this view. The court has
held that a defendant may be required to stand up in court or
to put on his hat for identification; that an accused may be com-
pelled to put his foot in tracks made at the scene of the crime
and officers may be allowed to testify as to the result; that an
accused may be allowed to testify as to the result; that an accused
may be compelled to submit to a medical examination for the
purpose of determining whether he is insane or has a certain
disease.1" Further, it has been held that an accused may be com-
pelled to stand before a fluoroscope and to take an enema in order
that stolen rings may be recovered;17 that his finger prints may
be taken after arrest and used as evidence;"8 and that he may be
compelled to write for the purpose of having his handwriting
compared with written documents. 9 In all these cases it is impor-
tant to note that the accused was not asked to consent to do cer-
tain things but was compelled to do them.
However, in Apodaca v. State, supra, where drunk driving was
an issue, the accused was compelled by officers after arrest to
1'48 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) § 2252; MCCORMICK AND RAY, TE.XAS
LAW OF EVIDENCE (1937) § 194.
'5 MCCORMICK AND RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE (1937) § 203.
16 Ibid.
17Ash v. State -..........Tex  Crirn. Rep .............- 141 S. W. 2d 341 (1940).
18 Conners v. State, 134 Tex. Crim. Rep. 278, 115 S. W. 2d 681 (1938).
1 Long v. State, 120 Tex. Crim. Rep. 373, 48 S. W. 2d 632 (1931) ; but see Beachem
v. State, 144 Tex. Crim. Rep. 272, 162 S. W. 2d 706 (1942).
[Vol. 7
NOTES AND COMMENTS
take a coordination test and a urine test. The court of criminal
appeals held that this violated the accused's constitutional right
against self-incrimination, and the testimony of the officers and
the results of the test were held inadmissible. But Holloway v.
State, supra, and the Brown and Heath cases 0 are clear that where
oral consent to a test is shown, this is sufficient. The most recent
case, Jones v. State, supra, re-affirms what the court said in the
McKay case, supra, calls for legislation on the subject, and dis-
tinguishes the Apodaca case as one in which the officers forced
the accused to do things which were "tantamount to forcing him
to testify." The Jones opinion explains that the finger print cases
and the cases in which the accused's shoes were placed in a track
were cases where the mechanical acts the accused was put through
were used merely for the purpose of obtaining proof of existing
facts, and not to support opinions of his condition. This appears
to the writer to be a very weak distinction in view of the fact
that the court has held from the beginning that an officer may
testify as to the defendant's thick tongue, staggering, etc., to sup-
port his opinion of his condition. Nevertheless, it would appear
from the foregoing cases that, with reference to the use of intoxi-
cation tests, the law of Texas at the present time is clear at least
to this extent: the tests are admissible for what they are worth;
the accused need not give consent in writing - oral consent is
sufficient - but the test is inadmissible if taken over the protest
of the accused. This leaves unanswered the question of a test taken
while the accused is unconscious or where neither consent nor
protest is shown.
It is respectfully submitted that on the basis of the decisions
discussed, and under a proper view of the privilege against self-
incrimination, 2' the results of a test taken while the accused is
unconscious, or where neither protest nor consent is shown, should
20 Cited supra note 12.
21 See MCCoRMICK AND RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE (1937) § 193, where it is




be admissible. In the Jones case the court, in asking for legisla-
tion on the subject, stated that it would appear to be an advantage
to both the defense and the prosecution to have a scientific means
of determining the debatable question of intoxication. Modern
science has discovered such a means, and, if what is wanted in
our courts is truth and justice, rather than opinions, these tests
certainly ought to be given legal status.
Of course, no wise district attorney or law enforcement person
would advocate a rule of evidence which might open the door
to police brutality, or to the violation of an accused's civil rights.
But if the reason for any rule of evidence is looked into, as well
as the matter of protection of the accused, one finds that the gen-
eral underlying principle behind any rule of evidence is, or should
be, to exclude untrue or unreliable evidence and to admit that
which has some basis of verity. The underlying principle of the
confession statute is to keep out untrue confessions - those ob-
tained by police brutality or by hope of reward or pardon - as
well as to discourage brutality. The principle behind the con-
stitutional provision is to prevent the accused from being com-
pelled to testify against himself - not to exclude evidence which
is naked to the eye or speaks for itself.
To resolve the problem of whether or not taking a test from
an unconscious person or taking one over the objection of a con-
scious one violates the self-incrimination privilege, and to insure
that the courts make the best use of scientific evidence available
to them, the Committee on Tests for Intoxication of the National
Safety Council passed a resolution at the National Safety Con-
ference in Chicago in October, 1952. The resolution was trans-
mitted to the Committee on Uniform Laws and Ordinances of the
National Safety Council. The resolution calls for an amendment
to the driver's license statutes making it a condition precedent to
the obtaining of a driver's license that one agree in writing to
submit to a scientific alcoholic test if he is ever arrested for driv.
ing while intoxicated. It is believed that such a statute would be
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constitutional inasmuch as the use of the highways has been held
to be a privilege and not a right, and any reasonable regulation
of their use is constitutional.22 It would seem that if a state under
its police powers can require a safety inspection of one's auto-
mobile and require certain physical standards for driving as a
condition precedent to the issuing of a license; or if a state can
force an out-of-state resident to appoint a service officer as his
agent if involved in an accident merely by the use of the high-
ways; 23 a state could require an agreement to take a scientifically
approved alcoholic test, if one is arrested for driving while intoxi-
cated, as a condition precedent to the issuing of a driver's license.
As our highways become more crowded and as automobiles
get faster, we can expect the problem of the drunk driver to be-
come more acute. There is a need for scientific evidence in our
courts so that the innocent person, who may have had a beer or
two, will not be prosecuted because he may have had a tragic
accident. There is a need for scientific evidence so that the guilty
drunk driver will get his just deserts in court. The court of crim-
inal appeals has done much in the right direction, and it can
do more, but as it has pointed out, it cannot legislate. The Legis-
lature should take the matter into hand.
Henry M. Wade.*
22 Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140 (1924) ; Taylor v. State, 151 Tex. Crim. Rep. 568,
209 S. W. 2d 191 (1948); Department of Public Safety v. Robertson, 203 S. W. 2d
950 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947), and many cases cited therein.
23 TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 2039a; O'Sullivan v. Brown, 171 F. 2d
199 (5th Cir. 1948) ; Morrow v. Asher, 55 F. 2d 365 (N. D. Tex. 1932).
*LL.B., University of Texas; District Attorney, Dallas County, Texas. The author
has been assisted in the preparation of this paper by Assistant District Attorney Sam
Daugherty, LL.B., Southern Methodist University.
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